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THE FUTURISM OF YOUNG ASIA.¹

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1. A "*Critique*" of Social Philosophy.

TOWARDS the end of the eighteenth century Immanuel Kant wrote the "Critique of Pure Reason," the "Critique of Applied Reason," and the "Critique of Judgment." The basic idea of this Critical Philosophy was to examine the methods and achievements of the human intellect between the great awakening of the Renaissance and the epoch of the French Revolution. Kant's criticism was "creative." It led to a "trans-valuation of values" as deep and wide as the "ideas of 1789." On the one hand, he established the validity of the physical sciences initiated by Galileo and Torricelli; and on the other, he pointed out their limitations by postulating the "categorical imperative" of man as a "moral agent."

If it is possible to generalize the diverse intellectual currents among the Turks, Egyptians, Persians, Hindus, Chinese, and Japanese of the twentieth century into any suitable formula, probably it should be called the "Critique of Occidental Reason." Through the political, industrial, literary, and educational institutions and propagandas of the Orient today there runs a common idea of "criticism." Young Asia has been taking a survey of the social philosophy and culture-anthropology which Eur-America has brought to the forefront between the "industrial revolution" (c. 1815) and the unsuccessful rising of the Chinese Boxers in 1900. Scepticism is the fundamental feature in the *Aufklärung* of the modern Orient. The "storm and stress" that is bringing a future Asia into being has its *élan* in the Mephistophelic doubt as to the validity of the Occidental pretensions.

¹ A lecture delivered at Clark University, November, 1917.

2. The Doctrine of Superior Races.

Probably the most universally accepted postulate in the thought of Europe and America is that the Occidental races are superior to the Oriental. The burden of school lessons, university lectures, and newspaper stories in these countries is to emphasize this notion. The whole world-culture of the previous five thousand years is assumed to be but as an insignificant preamble to the grand domination of the non-whites by the whites during the last few generations.

But how does the same history appear to the Oriental from his angle of vision? In his eyes it has been the historic rôle of Asia to be always the aggressor and of Europe to be ever on the defensive. By the test of arms the superior races of the world have been the Asians more often than the Europeans.

We need not go far back into the periods covered by Egyptology and Assyriology. We may begin with the Persians. During the fifth century B. C. the "Isles of Greece" were over-run by Darius and Xerxes. Their armies were recruited from every race of Western and Middle Asia, including the Hindus of the Punjab in India. Alexander's raid into Asia in the fourth century B. C. was but Europe's reply to the previous Asian adventure.

During the seventh and eighth centuries A. D., the Moslem Saracens pushed their arms into Europe as far as Spain and Southern France. Ask Charlemagne, he knows. The Pyrenees mountains became the Western boundary of Asia, and the Mediterranean Sea an Asian lake. The crusades started towards the end of the eleventh century (1099) were but attempts of the Christians at self-defence. It was against the tremendous "Asian peril" that these were directed by more or less pan-European alliances.

The "expansion of Asia" was undertaken from the north also by the Buddhists and Shamanists through the hordes of the Scythians, Mongols or Tartars of Central Asia. The Carpathian mountains, and not the Urals, remained for centuries the north-western boundary of Asia. "In Asia

and eastern Europe," as Yule remarks in his *Travels of Marco Polo*, "scarcely a dog could bark without Mongol leave from the borders of Poland and the Gulf of Scanderoon to the Amur and the Yellow Sea." The whole of Russia was a "dependency" of the Mongol Emperors of China during the thirteenth century. It was only towards the end of the sixteenth century that the counter-movement was set on foot by the Russians to avenge themselves on the long-endured Asianization of Europe.

But, in the meantime, Europe had to swallow another aggression from Asia. This began with the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Turkish empire was one of the greatest powers in Europe. Louis XIV knew it. The eastern boundary of Europe shrank under Asian pressure as far to the interior as Venice on the Adriatic Sea, and Vienna, the capital of the Habsburg emperors. The Turks laid siege to that imperial city once in 1529 and a second time as late as 1682. It was not until 1699 that the Holy League of the Venetian republic, the King of Poland, the Habsburg emperor, and Peter the Great succeeded in resisting any further advance of the Crescent into the lands of the Cross.

What, then, is the verdict of history on the question of superior races? Did not the Asians enjoy "spheres of influence" in Europe all through the Middle Ages down to the beginning of the eighteenth century? The period of Asian hegemony covered, in fact, a full thousand years, from a century before Charlemagne till Peter the Great and Louis XIV. Has not the number of Oriental aggressions into Europe been greater than that of Occidental into Asia? Whatever pseudo-history may be taught in the schools and colleges of Europe and America, among the Orientals themselves the memory of their own military superiority is a potent factor in their modern consciousness. It cannot easily fade away, because this was not a romance of legendary heroes in an ante-diluvian age. It is a fact of the "history of our own times."

The recent history of the world from the European success at Plassey in 1757 to the Asian victory at Port Arthur in 1905 is certainly the story of European expansion. But in the first place, this, again, is only the reaction of Europe to the Asian event of 1453. And in the second place, does this series of events during 150 years entitle the sociologist to propound the jingo cult of difference between the East and the West? This is the first question in the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia.

3. *The Logic of the Occident.*

Once upon a time a piece of painting was shown to a lion. It was the picture of a lion being trampled down by a man. The lion was asked as to how he liked that art-work. He replied: "Of course I have enjoyed it very much; but if a lion had painted this, the man would have been at the feet of the lion."

In modern times the entire Orient from Tokyo to Cairo has been a continent of peoples more or less "subject" in one form or another to the Occident. It is the "master" races that have studied the life and institutions of their dependencies, colonies, protectorates, spheres of influence. The mirror that has been held up to servile and semi-servile Asia by Eur-America has therefore naturally reflected this "lion in the painting" of the fable.

But let Asia get a chance to paint not only herself but also the culture of the Occident. She would at once proceed to imitate the *modus operandi* of Tsin Shi Hwangti (B. C. 221-210), who brought China for the first time under one Imperial Administration. The Confucian *literati* of his time seem to have been obstacles to his work of political consolidation. So, anticipating the "nation-makers" of the present day, he instituted a thorough-going censorship of thought and letters. He ordered a wholesale burning of all the ancient Chinese Classics. By destroying every vestige of the past he intended to inaugurate a new era of enlightenment and progress. It may be conjectured legitimately that if another Shi Hwangti were to appear in Asia

today he would begin by declaring a bonfire of a considerable portion of the Occidental literature on the Orient.

The archæological, exploratory, and translation work done in Asia during the nineteenth century and since under the auspices of Eur-American Governments, Research Societies, and sumptuously financed savants is indeed marvellous. It is in the *interpretation* of the unearthed facts, however, that the superstition of the "superior" race chiefly manifests itself.

We shall best understand the methodology of Occidental scholars with regard to Oriental culture if we apply it, say, to the First Book of Homer's "Iliad." We should then be announcing to the world that the Occident has never known what it is to act in union. The besetting sin of the European races, we should argue, has always been the mutual jealousy of their leaders. This has rendered the presenting of a common front against an enemy impossible, even on momentous occasions. The scandalous altercation between King Agamemnon and General Achilles on the Field of Troy is an evidence of this. The treason, the anti-national and Trojanizing wrath of Achilles was caused, moreover, by a most ignoble and detestable feature of European morals, viz., concubinage. The girl Briseis had been captured by Achilles. But King Agamemnon ordered him to deliver her to the royal camp for his own use. Passages from the "Iliad" may be quoted to prove also the polygamous practices of Europeans, the licentiousness and despotism of their rulers, and the universal subjection of women to a position of servility.

This type of interpretation would be easily condemned on the simple ground that one must not generalize about millenniums of Occidental civilization from single verses of a single poet. But this very truism disappears from the consciousness of Eur-American scientists while they apply their brain to the interpretation of what they choose to call the heart or soul or spirit of the Orient. The injustice of this method is probably the greatest of all factors that have contributed to the rupture of fellow-feeling between

the East and the West. And the futurists of Young Asia have their permanent fountain of inspiration in the intellectual pain and ill-treatment they have been accustomed to get from Eur-America's men of science.

4. *The Alleged Pessimism of the Orient.*

Max Müller wrote "India: what can it teach us?" The main trend of his thesis was to indicate that India can teach nothing but "sublime" speculations of an other-worldly character, the psychology of the soul, the ethics of retreat from the struggles of life, the metaphysics of the Infinite, etc. And Schopenhauer, himself a pessimist of the blackest dye, had brought to prominence some of the quietistic passages of the "Upanishads" and the Buddhist "Dhammapada." Since then it has become almost a fetish in the western world to take the Orient and pessimism as convertible terms. Especially is Buddhism known in the Occident as the cult of pacifism, annihilation, inactivity, non-resistance, monasticism, and so forth; and all other cults of the Orient are alleged to approximate this ideal more or less closely.

This notion about Oriental quietism and pessimism is one of the greatest *idolas* of the modern world. It cannot stand the least historical criticism.

First, the man Shakya-simha, called the Buddha (enlightened), was but one of the hundreds of India's leaders in the fifth and sixth centuries, B. C. They counted among them physicians, surgeons, logicians, publicists, diplomats, metaphysicians, sophists, etc. Shakya did not monopolize the whole thought and activity of the time.

Secondly, Shakya was not only the organizer of an order of monks and ascetics, like Pythagoras, but was the teacher also of duties for householders, consuls, archons, kings, merchants, and soldiers. Personally he was a firm believer in republicanism. The kingless polity of the United States of the Vajjians found in him its greatest champion. Quietism was the furthest removed from his teachings. Most of his followers were energists and active propagandists. They

founded charitable institutions, schools, rest-houses, and hospitals both for human beings and animals. Asoka the Great (B. C. 270-230), the so-called Constantine of Buddhism, was an internationalist. He brought the whole of Western Asia, Egypt, Greece, and Macedon within the sphere of Hindu culture.

Thirdly, the religion called Buddhism was never a paramount religion and never had an exclusive sway in India, China, or Japan. The terms "Buddhist India," "Buddhist China" or "Buddhist Japan" are thus misnomers. They cannot apply to any epoch of the country's history. Besides, in India especially, no religion has ever dominated the policy of rulers and ruling classes. The Hindu state has never been "theocratic" in theory or practice.

Fourthly, even those who called themselves Buddhists did not make it a rule to fly away from the sufferings of the world. They could still be fighters, citizens, presidents, and kings. They took part in political intrigues and court revolutions, and were casuists, when necessary, like the Jesuits of Europe. There are many instances of Buddhist monks organizing themselves into military orders in the mediaeval history of China, Japan, and India.

Further, the alleged pessimism of Shakya-simha's teachings had practically no influence on the general mass of the population. The rulers of India proceeded to their work according to the principles of statecraft. These were as far removed from *ahimsa* or non-killing as Macchiavelli's *Prince* and Treitschke's *Politics* from Jesus' "My kingdom is not of this world." Thus, for instance, the *Artha-Shastra* (text book of politics) was compiled within about a century after Shakya's death, by Kautilya, the Bismarck of India. The following are some of the injunctions which this code of militarism lays down (Book X, ch. iii):

(1) "Women with prepared food and beverage should stand behind, uttering encouraging words to fighting men." This is out-Spartaing Sparta. Here is a system of real "universal" conscription.

(2) "Physicians with surgical instruments, machines, remedial oils, and cloth in their hands . . . should stand behind uttering encouraging words to fighting men."

Besides, military service was not the monopoly of a special caste in India. The entire nation could be drilled at need. (*Ibid.*, Bk. IX, ch. ii.)

It is on such historic truths that the futurism of Young Asia is nurtured.

5. *The So-Called Opening of China.*

In 1842, at the end of the Opium War, China is said to have been "opened" by the treaty of Nanking. Since then more than 120 treaties have been concluded between the Chinese and the "Powers." Each treaty is a document of concessions of some sort or other wrung from the "sick man" of the Far East.

Between 1858 and 1885 almost the whole of the present-day French Indo-China was carved out of the Chinese Empire. By 1898 Russia, Germany, England, and France were masters of "possessions" on Chinese soil. Korea and Manchuria, parts of "Greater China," were passing into Russian hands. As the Chinese were too weak to resist, resistance was offered by Japan in 1904-1905 because her own independence would otherwise have been precarious. In 1910 Korea became Japanese territory. Since then Manchuria, Mongolia, Kashgaria (Turkestan), and Tibet have virtually passed out of China's hands. China has been opened indeed.

The number of foreign possessions within the bounds of China proper is not yet large. But there are over 100 stations, including treaty ports and stages on the Yangtze River and the West River, which have been opened to international trade. There are "foreign settlements" in ten of these places; and there is not a single harbour in all the three thousand miles of coast line in which the Chinese can mobilize their own ships without the consent of the foreigners.

The consular authorities of the foreign powers rule their "settlements" practically as possessions. Besides, throughout Chinese territory the foreigners are immune from China's jurisdiction. With regard to this "extra-territo-

riality" the following remarks about Japan of 1911 would indicate the present status of the Chinese in their own territory:

"A nation which had to accept some of the conditions contained in these treaties was not really autonomous. For instance, the Japanese were not allowed to impose more than a small tax upon imports—a limitation which deprived them of the control of their own fiscal system, and affected the building up of industries. Moreover, the treaties exempted foreigners, residing in Japan, from the operation of her own criminal laws and secured to them the privilege of being arraigned solely before tribunals of their own nationality. These provisos were disliked, not only because it sometimes happened that a foreigner was judge in a suit in which he was personally concerned, but because of the implication that Japan was unfit to exercise one of the fundamental attributes of every sovereign state—judicial autonomy." (Porter: "Japan: the new World-Power.")

Mining, railway, and industrial concessions are enjoyed by foreign commercial syndicates. These lead to the play of back-door influence, and are the perennial sources of intrigues. The little political life that pulsates through the corpse of China is thus thoroughly demoralized.

What through financial indebtedness, what through commercial and industrial wire-pullers, what through extra-territoriality, and what through the sympathy and charity of professional friends, Young China has to undergo every day all the "intervention" that Austria wanted to enforce on Serbia in July, 1914. Only, China has to submit to the demands of half a dozen Austrias at least. This is the meaning of the "open door" policy loudly proclaimed by all with equal vehemence.

What is the justification of this high-handed intervention in the rights of Chinese sovereignty? The sociologists, students of race-culture, and apostles of peace movements are ready with their scientific answer. The interests of humanity, democracy, and civilization are said to require that China must be opened at the point of the bayonet. It is alleged that by nature the Chinese are averse to foreign intercourse, and that exclusiveness is their greatest national vice.

According to the Critical Philosophy of Young Asia this allegation about China's exclusiveness and "splendid isolation" is perhaps the greatest untruth propagated by the "superior races" of the Occident. Can the combined intellect of Europe and America point to a single period of Chinese history in which the country was closed to foreigners? Is there any "cycle of Cathay" during which the Chinese refused to receive new arts and sciences from outsiders? Is there any epoch of Chinese culture that does not indicate the assimilation and imbibing of extraneous influences?

During the second century B. C., Chang Kien, the general of the famous Han emperor Wuti, penetrated into Western Asia (B. C. 135). He is known to have introduced the Persian vine into China. The opening of the route between the Far East and the "Roman Orient" was thus effected by a Chinese.

During the first century A. D., the Han emperor Mingti sent a deputation to the Central Asian province of "Greater India" in order to import the images of Buddha and Sanskrit texts (67 A. D.). According to a Chinese record, in the reign of Hwanti (147-168), Tienchu (India), Tatsin (Rome, Egypt, or Arabia) and other nations came to China by the Southern Sea, and Canton became the port of intercourse with foreigners. China's trade with the Byzantine empire is noticed in Cosmas' "Christian Topography" (530 A. D.). With the rise of Saracen Power, Chinese intercourse was established with the Mohammedans also in the seventh century.

The greatest epoch of Chinese civilization is the age of the mighty Tangs and brilliant Sung (618-1260). It was an era of Renaissance in poetry, painting, philosophy, and what not. This was a direct product of the "holy alliance" between India and China for centuries. The Chinese of this their "Augustan age" were not only open to foreigners, but were also sending out thousands of missionaries, statesmen, scholars, and architects in order to civilize the islands of Japan.

Under the Tangs, the Chinese empire had more than one city which was, like the cities of modern America, the babel of tongues, and the melting-pot of races. At Singan-fu, the capital, in the North West, there lived thousands of Hindu families, as well as Zoroastrians, Mohammedans, and Nestorian Christians. In 877 an Arab trader, Abu Zaid, described the port of Canfu near Hangchau, as the city in which 120,000 Mohammedans, Jews, Christians, and Magians were engaged in traffic.

The Chinese historians were always interested in "barbarian," *i.e.*, foreign countries and peoples. The official histories of the period from the Han to the Tang dynasty supply accurate information about Syria, Persia, Greece, and Parthia. The Chinese account of Constantinople is, according to Williams in *The Middle Kingdom*, more definite and exact than any contemporary Western account of the Chinese capital.

During the thirteenth century Marco Polo, the Venetian, was very well received by the Mongol emperor Kubla Khan. Many monks, Italian, French and Flemish, came on diplomatic missions to the Grand Monarch. Mongol dignitaries also went to Rome, Barcelona, Valencia, Lyons, Paris, London and Northampton.

During the next period, that of the Mings, the Portuguese first arrived in China in 1516. From that date until 1724 in the reign of Yung-cheng, the Manchu, the representatives of the modern European nations were heartily welcomed into the Chinese empire. Christian missionaries were entrusted both by the Ming and the Manchu emperors with the work of reforming the Chinese calendar according to European improvements in astronomy. The Chinese did not display any extra conservatism, but were receptive enough to be taught by foreigners. But the Christians soon made themselves "undesirable aliens." It was extreme political necessity, arising from the open intrigues and aggressions of the foreigners, that compelled the Chinese, as it had previously forced the Japanese, to declare their country closed. The Chinese did not forbid

the Europeans to enter China in the inhuman and humiliating way in which the enlightened, democratic, and humanitarian America of 1916 has deliberately proclaimed herself a forbidden land to the peaceful and industrious but flagless Aryans of Hindustan.

The cumulative effects of such aggressions, both positive and negative, have led the Orient to one inevitable conviction, viz., that the pseudo-science of open door is based on two arguments: (1) that nations have a right to "open" any country on earth only if they are backed by powerful guns, and (2) that a country can be "closed" to the only race on earth that has no right to bear arms. This belief has been a mighty feeder in the futurism of helpless Young Asia.

6. The Comparative Method.

The convenient perversion by jingoes of the historical truths about China's traditional foreign policy is but an aspect of the superstition to which the modern Eur-American mind has been inured by the dogma that naturally accrues to domineering and triumphant races. The futurists of Young Asia are therefore prepared to challenge the entire scientific machinery of the Occident in the study of culture-history. The work of Western sociologists is normally vitiated by one fundamental fallacy. This consists in a systematic malapplication of the comparative method in estimating the values of the Occidental and Oriental achievements.

Generally speaking, the "Orientalists" commit three fallacies in the application of the comparative method to the study of race-questions:

(1) They do not take the same class of facts. They compare the superstitions of the Orient with the rationalism of the Occident, while they ignore the rationalism of the Orient and suppress the superstitions of the Occident. They compare the thoughts and activities of the higher intellectual and economic grades of the Occident with those of the illiterates, paupers, and half-fed masses of the Orient. Intellectual fairness demands, however, that mentality and

morality should be compared under "the same conditions of temperature and pressure."

Christian missionaries and even scientists of research societies take a morbid delight in picking up the worst features of Oriental life and thought. Ultimately through the movies, theaters, and journals, the Orient has become to their nationals a synonym for immorality, sensuousness, ignorance, and superstition.

But, was it not in Europe that political philosophy and political propaganda were based on the following wisdom?

"The sun is superior to the moon—St. Peter gave two swords to Christ. The Pope is like Sinai, the source of the oracle of God, and is superior to all kings and princes because Mt. Sinai is higher than other hills. Adam was the first king, Cain the first priest. The most perfect polity can be discovered within the pages of the Old and New Testaments. . . . The actions of Samuel or Uzziah or Jehoida or Ehud could be made into a system whereby all future political methods could be judged." (Figgis: *From Gerson to Grotius*.)

Again, while expatiating on Oriental erotics, Eur-American scholars with a safe conscience manage to forget the Greek romances of Heliodorus, Longus, and Tatius among the ancients, the Provencals and Troubadours of France, the "Wächterlieder" of the German minnesingers, the Italian cult of feminine beauty summarized by Burckhardt, and the "courtly love" in Chaucer and Gower. They are not at all moved by the fact that from the adultery among the gods described, *e.g.*, in the "Odyssey" (Book VIII) down to the sex-exciting advertisements of to-day founded on the principles of experimental psychology (applied to business), erotics of an intense and direct character has had a continuous sway throughout the Occidental world.

(2) The Eur-American sociologists do not apply the same method of interpretation to the data of the Orient as to those of the Occident. If superstition and sexuality have to be explained away or justified in one instance by "historical criticism," or by anthropological investigations, or on the strength of studies in adolescence, Freudianism, psychoanalysis, etc., they must be treated in the same way in the other.

(3) The Occidental scholars are not sufficiently well grounded in "comparative chronology." They do not proceed to the work of striking a balance between the claims of the East and the West, age by age, *i.e.*, idea by idea, and institution by institution, in a time-sequence. They compare the old conditions of the Orient with the latest achievements of the Occident, and they ignore the fact that it is only during the last few decades that the same old conditions have disappeared from the West.

7. *The Age of Modernism.*

The present is the age of pullman cars, electric lifts, bachelor apartments, long distance telephones, zeppelins, and the "new woman." In their Oriental studies the Euro-American scholars seem to assume that these have been the inseparable features of the Western world all through the ages. If they were really conscious that some of these were not known to their grandfathers, and others even to their fathers, they could easily resist the temptation of finding some essential distinction between the Occidental and Oriental "ideals." Most of the emphasis laid on the influence of latitude, altitude, temperature, and "general aspects of nature" on civilization and "*Weltanschauung*" could then be automatically condemned as unhistorical.

Even in the days of Goethe, as described by Lewes, alchemy maintained its place among conflicting hypotheses, and the philosopher's stone had many seekers.

So far as economic conditions are concerned, nobody in the eighteenth century could announce the dictum: "East is East, and West is West." In spite of all the advantages of climate there was no "industrial revolution" in Europe till towards the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century. The people of Asia from Chandragupta to Kanghi would not have found any fundamental difference in Europe from Pericles to Frederick the Great. Modern sociologists who are following in the wake of Bodin, Montesquieu, Buckle, and Hegel, in the "geographical interpretation of history" should carefully ponder over this fact.

The sociologist who likewise seeks to find a distinctively new type of humanity in the Oriental woman can supply his own correctives if he remembers the facts exhibited by Professor Calhoun in his *Social History of the American Family*.

The history of criminal law and capital punishment in England indicates, again, how late into modern times barbarity and inhumanity reigned in Europe. During the second quarter of the nineteenth century there were about two hundred and fifty offences for which the sentence was death. It is only since 1861 that capital punishment has been restricted to the offences of murder, treason and piracy.

Education is to-day the birth-right of every man and woman in the Occident. But such a statement could not be made before 1870. The educational advance in Eur-America during the last half-century must not be regarded as the norm of the Western world for the previous three millenniums.

Of the English people married even so late as in 1843, 32 per cent of the men and 49 per cent of the women could not read and write. They signed their names on the marriage register with a cross.

In 1833 Guizot, the French minister of education, instituted an inquiry into the educational condition of France. "Here are some of the sad results of the inquiry; all the teachers did not know how to write, . . . the ignorance was general."

Are the philosophers and scientists then justified in making a case for the historical difference in the "views of life" or outlook on the universe between the East and the West? The Critical Philosophy of Young Asia says "No" on the strength of comparative history.

8. *The Event of 1905.*

The story of modern Japan is a verification of this critical philosophy of Young Asia. The triumph of Japan over Russia is thus of profound significance to social science.

The fact is generally misinterpreted in the Western World. Diplomats in Eur-America see in this the nucleus of a pan-Asian crusade against the whites. But the fear is utterly unfounded. Neither religion, nor race, nor language, nor all combined are necessarily strong cementing principles in the making of alliances. No effective federation could be formed among the little Hellases of antiquity. The confederacy of Delos, the Achaean League, the Aetolian League were all failures. The Mohammedan Caliphate broke very early into three sovereignties, subsequently into myriads. The alliances in mediaeval Europe were kaleidoscopic in character. The Christian Powers have for the last four hundred and fifty years failed to organize a common policy against the "infidel" Turks. Even the success of Japan was due to the fact that Russia was not actively assisted by her Christian brethren against the non-white pagan. An Asian Monroe Doctrine under the auspices of Japan would be as big a dead letter *in practical politics* as the famous message of the American President in 1823.

The event of 1905 is a formative force in the futurism of Young Asia from altogether another angle. In the first place, the recognition of Japan as a first class power has purged the atmosphere of the science-world of a great part of its arrogance and superstition. It has compelled moderation in the tone of the Occident with regard to the Orient. It has demolished the "papal infallibility" which Eur-American scholars had been ascribing to their races during the nineteenth century. The logic of the "white man's burden" has thus become an anachronism except only to the blindest fanatics.

In the second place, the events at Port Arthur and on the Tsu-shima Sea, the Marathon and Salamis of Asia, have proved in the only manner intelligible to the human mind that modernization is neither the monopoly of the Albinos, nor a very complicated and difficult process. The time-value of the sum-total of modernism is, pragmatically speaking, not more than twenty-five or thirty years. Let us note the facts.

In 1853 Commodore Perry presented Japan with the electric telegraph, steam locomotive, telescope, clocks, maps, agricultural machinery, etc. But it was not till 1870 that the first line of telegraph was set up between Yokohama and Tokyo. The first railway line of 18 miles was constructed in 1872. And it was really during the period between 1880 and 1886 that the Japanese seriously commenced their novitiate in Eur-American culture. Within two decades of her "freshman" stage, however, Japan was master enough of the new arts and sciences to be able to browbeat a white aggressor. If there had been any difference between the East and the West in 1853, or 1867, or 1886, it was completely broken down in 1905.

It is clear that in spite of the epoch-making "industrial revolution" brought on by steam the West had not gone very far ahead of the East. The year 1905 has demonstrated, further, that the Asian civilization with which Japan started on the race about 1870 was not radically distinct from the Eur-American, but that it was slightly poorer and "inferior" only because it had not independently produced the steam engine. Scientifically speaking, there is thus nothing miraculous in the phenomenal developments of new Japan.

Since 1905 Japan herself has indeed been anxious to proclaim to the world that she is different from, and superior to, the rest of Asia in her ideals, institutions, and methods. But this notion is confined within the circle of a few diplomats, such professors as virtually hold diplomatic posts, and journalists who have touch with the jingo members of Parliament. It is, in fact, preached, in foreign languages only, by a section of those who have to come across, or make it a point to write for, Eur-American statesmen, scholars and tourists. The masses of the Japanese, and these diplomats themselves at home, are always conscious that ever since the days of Shotoku Taishi (A. D. 573-621) and Kobo Daishi (774-835), *i.e.*, since the very dawn of their civilization, the constitution, social hierarchy, architecture, moral notions, gods and goddesses, and even

the folk-lore and superstitions of Japan have been Chinese and Hindu.

But it is not difficult to explain the tone and trend of some of the recent Japanese manifestoes and publications. These are designed to report to foreign governments, universities, and libraries that Japan is fundamentally different from the Asia that is under subjection to the Powers. These statements are perfectly legitimate measures of self-defence on the part of the Japanese. Without such shifts Japan apparently cannot come into line with the other "superior races," whose logic has been ruling the market. She has learnt by bitter experience that the first class powers of the world would not admit her into their caste if she were to appear to them in indigenous *kimono* and *geta*, or were to offer to foreign guests her unsugared *ocha* (green tea) without milk, and *khasi* cakes. Japanese bankers and officials, captains and policemen, are compelled to have the Eur-American paraphernalia of public life. This is abhorred by most of them in their heart of hearts. But they have to swallow it. They must pay some price for their recognition as citizens of the only "civilized" state of Asia.

The recent Japanese attitude of "superiority," though very limited, to Chinese and Hindu civilization, is merely an aspect of this compulsory Occidentalization. Unless the claim of separateness from the Asians is strongly put forward, the Occident would not care to treat with Japan as a peer. It was by urging such distinctions from the semi-subject Chinese and the subject races of India that she induced the United States to modify the Immigration Bill of 1916 especially in her favor. Young Asia accepts the entire situation as an inevitable corollary of the long-standing aggression of the Occident, of the tyranny of Albinocracy in the world. It does not, therefore, find fault with Japan, but rather pities her isolated condition.

Old Asian institutions and ideas are indeed still paramount in Japan. It is not a fact, and it cannot be psychologically conceived, that the Japanese were Eur-Americanized during the brief period under review. None of her

Asian characteristics have thus stood in the way of Japan's growth as an "industrial power."

We get a bit of social Japan in the Japanese scholar Uyehara's "Political Development of Japan": "Young people of England and America would be shocked if they were told that boys and girls are not allowed to choose their life partners for themselves."

A class of "untouchable" outcasts still exists in Japan. They are called Etta. They live in the outskirts of towns and villages. Though they have been legally enfranchised since 1872 the social prejudice against them has survived. The Japanese deities can be grouped as (1) stellar bodies, (2) the elements of the earth, air, fire, water, (3) natural phenomena, (4) prominent natural objects, as mountains, trees and caverns, (5) men, (6) animals. There is a Japanese proverb to the effect: "What god we know not, yet a god there dwells."

In spite of all these social features objectionable from the latest Eur-American standpoint, Japan has succeeded in making herself into the "great Far Eastern ally" of England and the phobia of the United States. Young Asia therefore naturally asks the question: "Are not the customs and conventions of the Orient of at least the same political and military significance as those of the Occident?" The answer has been given in the event of 1905.

9. The Demand of Young Asia.

In the name of religion the missionaries, and in the name of science the scholars, have been rousing the worst passions of Oriental humanity. They dare do this because they know that Young Asia is unarmed and disarmed. And they can afford to exasperate pretty nearly one thousand million human beings as long as these men and women remain unrepresented by independent armies and independent navies.

The existence of Japan as the only free soil of the Asians is not an effective means of bringing the Western world to its senses. Japan, no doubt, is a first class power. But she

is not strong enough to command the respect of the nations. She has not really stood on her legs as yet. It was but a few years ago, in 1911, that the humiliating "extra-territoriality" clauses were withdrawn by the Powers from their treaties with Japan. She is too weak even to suppress the anti-Japanese journalism of the aliens in the heart of her capital. And in foreign politics she is in perpetual danger of being cornered by the Whites. In fact, the subjection of the rest of Asia to the non-Asians is a standing menace to her own safety. She has ever to be on the alert against another "Russian advance" of 1904.

Events are everywhere tending to the great cataclysm when the adjustment of the relations between the East and the West would have to be submitted to the final court of appeal—the arbitrament of the sword. But before that inevitable day comes the road to world's peace may be considerably smoothed through the judicious co-operation of the intellectuals of the Occident and the Orient.

Young Asia does not want sympathy or charity. The demand of Young Asia is justice. It is nothing short of the equality of treatment as between the whites and the non-whites. And this not only in ambassadorial speeches, and parliamentary manifestoes, or presidential messages, but also in the discussions of learned societies, in school rooms, theaters, moving picture shows, daily journals, and monthly reviews.

The abolition of race-prejudice existing at present is possible only under two conditions:

(1) There must be an ethical revolution in Eur-America. The Occident must learn to treat the Orient—its morals, manners and sentiments, its struggles and failures in the only way which would be tolerated by the dignity of man. There must not be one standard for judging human flesh in the West and another standard for judging it in the East.

(2) There must be a psychological revolution in Eur-America. The very attitude from which scientists have approached the Orient will have to be completely abandoned. The fact of nineteenth century success and over-

lordship must not be allowed to prejudice the brain of scholars. Oriental culture must be weighed in the balance under the same conditions of study as the Occidental.

Only under these conditions, in the recovery by Young Asia of its natural rights from the temporary aggressors and illegitimate usurpers, would sanity prevail in the deliberations of the great Peace-Council convened by the Parliament of Man. The futurists of Young Asia are looking forward to that spiritual rebirth of the world.

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